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Introduction and Thesis  For over a hundred years now, we have been heatedly arguing over how to distinguish 
science from pseudoscience (or rather, from any non-scientific activity). This problem of 
demarcation is still around because we have difficulty in pinning down just exactly what we 
mean when we say “science” or when we call something “scientific”. “Scientific” is a term 
that should be reserved for our most respected knowledge - knowledge that we can be 
confident of due to the rigorous nature in which we ascertain it. 
To pin down what we mean when we say “science” and hence, to settle this problem 
of demarcation, we will need to find out what is/are the defining characteristics of science. In 
this paper, I will attempt to show that the essential criterion for what makes a theory 
scientific is its predictive power. I will first introduce the problem by providing Kuhn and 
Lakatos’ views, which I believe are great descriptions of science. Then I will propose that 
what we care most about science is its technological applications and that scientific theories 
must make predictions in order to have any application. Finally, I will provide possible 
problems for using prediction as the quintessential criterion for science and also discuss some 
other criteria (proposed by Kuhn) to help settle the problem of demarcation. 
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Kuhn & Lakatos on Science  To discuss the demarcation problem, I think I should first briefly introduce Thomas 
Kuhn, who came up with an extremely persuasive description of how science works, and 
Imre Lakatos, who refined the model to something that was more appealing to Kuhn’s critics. 
Kuhn believed that science could only start when people came to an agreement on the 
methodology of assessing the correctness of ideas. He used the term paradigm to describe a 
pattern or set of rules that people would follow to carry out their assessments. Now, once 
people have a paradigm to settle disputes, they could make progress by developing more 
theories about how the world works and figuring out if their ideas were right or wrong. Kuhn 
called this normal science, a period of science (science was cyclical and had different periods 
in Kuhn’s view) where people could engage in puzzle solving through “fact collection and 
theory articulation”1. The period succeeding normal science however, is what Kuhn called 
crisis. Sometimes, the paradigm that people are working under does not allow them to resolve 
issues or account for anomalous data that they get from their observations. When a critical 
amount of these anomalies build up, their paradigms become open to criticism as people 
begin to look for new paradigms that might satisfy their observations. Eventually, a scientific 
revolution occurs with a new paradigm replacing the old one and normal science ensues 
under the new paradigm. The cycle then continues, possibly ad infinitum. Kuhn also went on 
to say that competing paradigms were incommensurable and could only be assessed by their 
own standards. Many people took issue with this due to the implication that if Kuhn was 
right, scientific theories are chosen for personal (subjective) and hence “irrational” reasons. 
One of the persons with such an issue, was Imre Lakatos. 
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Lakatos had a view that was for the most part the same as Kuhn’s but with different, 
clearer terminology. Much like paradigms, Lakatos’ research programmes had a stubbornly 
defended hard core that was surrounded by a protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses that were 
amenable to change in order to protect the hard core. Apart from this terminology change, the 
critical difference in Lakatos’ view is that he believes research programmes can run in 
parallel (whilst Kuhn didn’t) and that we do have a “rational”† way choose between these 
paradigms/research programmes. Lakatos refers to research programmes as either progressive 
(good, scientific, fruitful) or degenerate (bad, pseudoscientific, unproductive). The way to 
differentiate between progressive and degenerate programmes is to look at their predictive 
power. Progressive research programmes lead to the discovery of novel facts (finding 
observations predicted by theory) whilst degenerate ones lag behind and play catch-up to the 
facts. Lakatos’ solution however, still did not say when a degenerate programme should be 
terminated - there’s always the possibility of a degenerate programme turning into a 
progressive one. Because of the inability of Lakatos’ model to determine when a degenerate 
programme crosses the point of no return, it cannot be used as a solution to the demarcation 
problem. 
Regarding this issue, Lakatos himself believed that a hard line couldn’t be drawn to 
separate science from pseudoscience. For Karl Popper, that line could be drawn and was 
called falsifiability.2 For Kuhn, the line seemed to be whether or not a field had puzzles to 
solve.3 Lakatos on the other hand, thought there was no line and the scientificness of a theory 
had to rest on a continuum with our best science at the top end of the spectrum and 
pseudoscience at the tail end. I am very much with Lakatos in this respect, along with using 
his concept of research programmes to describe how science works… but what I wish to do 
                                                † I put “rational” and “irrational” in scare quotes because Kuhn thinks that even though scientists choose paradigms based on a mixture of “subjective and objective, or of shared and individual criteria”, science does operate rationally (with intersubjectivity), which I’m inclined to agree. 
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today is to, in Kuhn’s terminology, “articulate” the importance of the criterion of prediction 
and to show that it is quintessential to science. 
Prediction is what we really care about 
In philosophy, I believe we are mostly arguing about how to describe concepts which 
we are very familiar with, concepts that we seem to intuitively understand and are capable of 
providing examples for… but these concepts are difficult to define concretely. “Science” is 
just such a concept and I think that since we have a pretty good intuition of what science is, 
we should appeal to that intuition to figure out what we really mean when we talk about 
“science”. 
 
To expose our intuition of what science really is, I will begin with a hypothetical 
quotation: 
 
“Scientifically proven!” 
- Every advertisement ever 
 
This phrase has been used so frivolously that people are now unreceptive to it but you 
will still frequently find the same tone used in many advertisements today. Why? Because 
most people trust science and consider scientific knowledge to be one of the most robust 
kinds of knowledge we can have. To have something be scientifically proven is to have it be 
“really” proven. 
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It’s “scientifically proven”! Though I think “designed or tested with some methodology that 
kind of resembles science” is more accurate. 
 
People understand that a lot of the tools they use are contingent on technology that is 
developed using science. Many people would also agree that technology improves our 
efficiency, safety, and by extension quality of life. For this reason, I say that what we (people 
in general, not just the intelligentsia) treasure most about science is its powerful applications 
through engineering and technology. It can be argued that there is great value in the 
“explanatory power” of scientific theories, or that going on the never-ending quest for “truth” 
is, in and of itself, a great virtue. However, people are often happily satisfied by nonsense 
explanations (I guess I can only call them nonsense with the benefit of hindsight) and also 
enjoy casually considering “truth” to simply be “based on perspective”. Nonetheless, 
everyone has ultimately been convinced about the efficacy of science due to its technological 
applications. 
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Just to be thorough, it should be stated that technology does not require science, as 
can be seen in more primitive technologies such as obsidian spear points and wheels. 
However, much of our technology today relies on information revealed to us by 
science. An oft cited example is the radio, which (I believe it cannot be overstated) has 
dramatically changed our lives for ever. Our understanding of electromagnetic waves and its 
manipulation has allowed for experimentation and refinement of radio technology to the point 
where most people, almost anywhere in the world, can communicate with one another. 
Although experimentation with wireless (not just radio) communication began before James 
Clerk Maxwell predicted the existence of electromagnetic waves, the prediction his theory 
made stimulated the field greatly and, along with Hertz’s experimental verification, led 
Marconi to develop the first device capable of long range radio communication. From this 
short example, it can further be restated that science reveals to us what is possible and shows 
us where to focus our efforts for technological advancement. 
So how does all this connect to the predictive capability of scientific theories? 
Scientific models of the world that provide any useful information to us at all have to make 
predictions. A theory that makes no predictions has, in a sense, no effect on the world. 
Another way to look at it is in terms of falsifiability. If a theory cannot be falsified by some 
observed effect in the world, it has no effect or usefulness in terms of technological 
applications for us. 
Take for example the hypothesis that “God is love”. What does this predict? The 
words “God” and “love” by themselves are so ill-defined, people will happily attach their 
own meanings to those terms. For the hypothesis to be useful to us, we will need to agree on 
a definition, and the resultant hypothesis would need to somehow entail that if “God is love”, 
then some specific observable thing will happen. For example, let’s say that in our theory 
“God” actually means “dog” and “love” actually means “hungry”. If our model also says we 
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expect something to happen when “dog is hungry” - something like “dog will look for food to 
eat” - then we have made a prediction and our theory is now falsifiable (it will be falsified if 
our prediction does not come true). Without falsifiability, the hypothesis supposes no 
observable effect for us and hence is not useful to us and can be considered to be a 
meaningless hypothesis/sentence.  
 
Possible problems with prediction  One counterexample that might serve to derail this line of thinking is string theory. 
String theory is commonly considered to fall under the purview of science but in is current 
state is effectively unfalsifiable… how do we deal with this? I say the issue is fairly straight-
forward - string theory is an example of a degenerate research programme and is becoming 
less and less of a science. According to Lee Smolin, string theory originally precluded the 
possibility of dark energy and when the universe was discovered to be accelerating (which 
implied dark energy), string theory modified itself to fit the observation.4 String theory today, 
has many forms and is referred to as superstring theory and even M-theory, which is basically 
a combination of all the internally consistent string theories. I must admit that I know very 
little about string theory and that Lee Smolin’s argument is also controversial (to the small 
group of people qualified to talk about string theory) but string theory itself has been a 
constant target in the scientific community for being very unfruitful throughout its lifespan. 
This is not to say that we should suspend research on string theory, certainly not. Though 
Lakatos might say that it is not our business to decide on such policies, I am willing to go 
further to say that we should continue such research indefinitely, with the resources spent 
being appropriate to how fruitful people anticipate the field to be. I’m probably going off on 
a tangent here but I think we should never consider a research programme to be fully killed 
or un-revivable. Much in the same way that the famous (or infamous) atheist polemicist 
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Christopher Hitchens, when asked if we should “in fact wish to see a world without faith”, to 
the surprise of his peers, replied “I think I would have to say that I don’t.”5, I think we should 
not wish to see thoroughly degenerate research programmes abandoned forever. Hitchens 
goes on to weakly (at least I think it’s weak) justify that we require an opposing view in order 
apply a sort of dialectic method, so that we can understand why we believe in what we 
believe in (in his context, religion or God, in our context, degenerating research programmes 
or theories). He does not however go on to explicitly say that there is a chance we might be 
wrong, but I think that since we can all agree that there is always such a miniscule chance, 
that is reason enough that we should apply just as miniscule an effort to continue research in 
degenerating fields (e.g. some pitiful person somewhere might still be unsuccessfully trying 
to rectify the Ptolemaic model, and that person should not be stopped on “scientific” 
grounds… perhaps that pity might turn to praise one day, though we are all right to highly 
doubt that). Before I end this section with string theory, I should probably note that there is 
this notion floating around that theories with mathematical elegance, a kind of simplicity, has 
historically often turned out to be true… the implication of this is that we might want to 
include theories (like string theory) with mathematical elegance as falling under the purview 
of science even though they might as of yet make no predictions. I think this makes a case for 
the criterion of simplicity being important in science but I don’t think that makes it 
necessary. Perhaps this is more a question of mathematics than science but in any case, for 
something like string theory, the fact that defenders of it frequently push back on the notion 
that it does not have any predictive power is also good indication that these same people who 
argue for elegance do believe that predictive power is of crucial importance in science. 
Going back to talking about the criterion of predictive power, I believe that the 
discourse above is persuasive in saying that predictive power is necessary for considering 
whether or not something is scientific… but is it sufficient? Well, I don’t claim that it is but 
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to help explore this question, we can now, instead of looking at string theory - a field we 
generally think of as scientific but difficult to test - look at a field that is actually quite easy to 
test but that we think of as unscientific: astrology. 
Astrology is now considered by most scientists, universities and careful thinkers in 
general to be a pseudoscience but it used to be treated much more seriously and was a very 
widely practiced system (there are still plenty of people and even large organisations that 
believe in or practice astrology, but this is rare in academic and governmental institutions). 
Just like the science of today, astrology actually also made testable predictions. The 
difference is that these predictions were never reliable. Even in its current form, the claims of 
astrology are testable. Shawn Carlson published a paper in Nature in 1985, where he 
described two double-blind tests performed under conditions which both advisors of the 
scientific community and of the astrological community agreed upon.6 The results, 
unsurprisingly, showed that predictions made by natal astrology proved no better than 
chance. There have been more tests with unfavourable results for astrology but despite its 
constant failure, astrology remains popular (at least we can agree though that it has been 
relegated to the status of pseudoscience – even believers of astrology themselves generally 
accept that the system is unscientific.) In this sense, we can consider astrology to be a former 
science that has since been disproven but for reasons unknown (probably psychological and 
historical), continues to be practiced as a pseudoscience… the Lakatosian way to put it 
would be that astrology is now a degenerate research programme. The factors leading to 
astrology’s transition from science to pseudoscience can be viewed as due to the constant 
failure of astrology’s predictions as well as due to its lack of fruitful research 
opportunities (such as to develop the theory to make new predictions). These two issues 
mentioned above in bold can be thought of as more criteria for what makes a scientific theory 
good and serves as my segue into talking about criteria other than predictive power. 
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So what about criteria other than predictive power?  The two issues of astrology just mentioned (above in bold) can be seen as accuracy 
and fruitfulness... and constitutes two of the five criteria that Kuhn proposed is his paper 
“Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice”.7 The criteria are all listed below and for 
the sake of brevity, are tagged with a short definition that I think fairly describes what Kuhn 
meant when he listed them. 
 
1. Accuracy 
Theories’ predictions should match observations. 
2. Consistency 
 Theories should be both internally and externally consistent. 
3. Scope 
Theories should be widely applicable; it should predict more than we already observe. 
4. Simplicity 
Theories should make previously confusing sets of phenomena more orderly and 
hence easier to understand. 
5. Fruitfulness 
Theories should lead to showing us new, previously unknown phenomena or 
relationships. 
 
I actually want to say that these criteria can sort of be seen as measures of predictive 
power but before I do that, I should point out some problems for Kuhn’s five criteria (which 
he also pointed out himself). These criteria make sense in the abstract but looking at them 
carefully and attempting to apply them is very difficult.  
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First off, the individual criteria are difficult to quantify and are kind of open to 
interpretation depending on the context/theory they are being applied to. For example, one 
theory might be more accurate in one matter whilst the competing theory might be more 
accurate in another (let’s say theory A of the solar system is more accurate at predicting the 
location of the moon but theory B of the solar system is more accurate at predicting the 
location of mercury… all else being equal, how do you decide?) 
Secondly, since we have multiple criteria, apart from “theory choice” we now also 
have the issue of “criteria choice”. For example, what do we do when one theory has better 
scope and another has better fruitfulness? Which should take precedence? That is again, 
unclear. 
Because of problems like these, Kuhn proposed that these criteria were intersubjective 
(I’m using this term, again, for the sake of brevity) and argued that although it is not does 
follow hard and fast rules or “algorithms”, it is not using these criteria for theory choice is not 
irrational because they are agreed upon standards. Kuhn also felt that the fact that there were 
no hard and fast rules was actually a strength and not a weakness of science, since there was 
room for creativity (instead of strictly following some algorithm that always lead to the same 
conclusion), science could grow. 
Apart from what Kuhn thinks, I think (with my admitted tunnel vision for supporting 
predictive power) the criteria are all actually very closely related to predictive power. 
Accuracy obviously refers to how well predictions and observations match, consistency is 
really about having predictions from theories that don’t conflict with one another, scope is 
about how a scientific theory should not just account for current data but also be able to 
account for future data (make predictions!) and fruitfulness talks about how likely we think a 
theory can be developed to give us more predictions. Simplicity however, is a different beast 
that probably deserves its own paper and is beyond the scope of this one but it suffices to say 
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that you could also rate predictions by their simplicity or complexity (though this is not what 
Kuhn meant, the definition Kuhn gave is more akin to saying that theories that are simple are 
able to explain phenomena). 
With all that in mind, I think that though you can come up with other criteria, it still 
all boils down to prediction. 
Summary   Scientific theories can be grouped into degenerate or progressive research 
programmes but what criteria should we use to differentiate degenerate programmes from 
progressive ones? Predictive power is a prime candidate and here is why: 
 
1. We should define science by what people consider to be most important about science 
2. People consider the technological advancements of science to be the most important 
thing about it 
3. For a scientific model to be able to contribute to technological advancements, it must 
have predictive power 
 
Therefore, predictive power is the defining characteristic of what makes a model or 
theory scientific. There are still issues with trying to use predictive power as a hard and fast 
rule for determining whether or not something is scientific (it might, for example, be that the 
domain is not dichotomous but continuous) but the point I’m making in this paper is not that 
using predictive power as the criterion for theory choice solves demarcation, it is that 
predictive power is at the heart of all that we think is science and so must play a role in 
defining what science is (if we ever somehow come to an agreement on that).  
Our reverence and awe for science can be seen as analogous to the awe and fear 
tribesman had for their soothsayers. Throughout human history, we find all methods of 
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divination spread throughout the world: geomancy, oneiromancy, hydromancy, 
hepatomancy, cartomancy, cleromancy, palmistry… the list goes on and on. But today, one 
method of divination stands out above the rest. Today, with science, we can have that power 
of divination, but this time, we can have it for real. 
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